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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DIMENSIONS OF INTIMATE
VIOLENCE: ANOTHER STRAND IN
THE DIALECTIC OF FEMINIST
LAWMAKING
RHONDA COPELON∗
It is a deep pleasure to gather to discuss Liz’s great book Battered
Women and Feminist Lawmaking1 and a privilege to be part of this great
gathering. Liz and I have shared each others paths as feminist
lawyers, teachers, scholars and friends for over thirty years. This book
is for me a journey into both past and future as well as more deeply
into her persistently reflective, illuminating and generative analysis.
It is a powerful illustration of the indispensability of activist feminist
scholarship and critical feminist activism. Thank you Liz, for the
pains you took and the other pleasures you forewent.
The documentation of the history of our movement and Liz’
thoughtful reflections on the continuing dialectic and challenges are,
indeed, a gift to all of us and to women in many parts of the world
who have been struggling to have recognized and to eliminate
violence against women. In that process, and unlike most United
States activists, many of our sisters abroad have turned to the
framework and mechanisms of international human rights to both
legitimate and advance their struggles and, in so doing, have
contributed to the vision and tools we can be using here.
Characteristically, Liz transcends the traditional frames within which
we work and recognizes the significance of these developments and
the similar impetus they can provide to our own domestic struggle
here.
My comments today will briefly trace the history and theoretical
∗
Professor of Law and, Director of the International Women’s Human Rights
Law Clinic, City University of New York School of Law. She thanks Liz, Ann Shalleck and
the editors for making this symposium possible.
1. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000).
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obstacles in this process and elaborate on how the human rights
framework and human rights activism can assist us here in the United
States, as well as how the dialectic of state dependency,
depoliticization and the disaggregation of violence from equality,
signaled by Liz, compromise international human rights and present
continuing challenges for women’s human rights activists and
scholars as well.
In 1990, womens’ human rights issues were barely on the margin of
the international human rights agenda. The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
2
(“CEDAW”) was consigned to little more than window-dressing.
Violence against women was almost never addressed in either official
or non-governmental human rights documentation and reporting.
Even when the state was responsible for rape, for example, it was
usually was treated as a personal matter, rendered invisible and
immunized from accountability. Rape in war was also on shaky
ground as it had evolved in international humanitarian law only as
implicit in the crime of “humiliating and degrading treatment” or in
the “offense against honor and dignity” rather than as an explicit,
named crime of violence.
In response, a burgeoning and irrepressible international feminist
women’s human rights movement coalesced and identified violence
against women, by intimates and officials alike, as a priority issue of
human rights in its preparations for the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna (“Vienna Conference”). In the early stages,
the allies were visionaries or renegades from mainstream thinking or
women, in various positions in and out of governments, who
themselves were survivors of rape or battering.
Leading mainstream human rights non-governmental advocates,
however, adhered to a state-centric approach to human rights and
were just beginning to recognize the severity of gender-based
violence. With narrow exceptions like slavery, the traditional view was
that human rights address only the actions of the state, not private
individuals. In this view, state action which inflicts violence of
sufficient gravity upon women would constitute a human rights
violation. But privately inflicted violence, while appropriate for
condemnation by municipal criminal laws, did not, they argued,
present a human rights concern apart from some form of active state
involvement.
Thus, when state officials inflicted violence on
women—for example, rape in prison—that would be a violation, for

2. G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980).
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example, of the right of personal security. And, if the state treated
violence against men and women unequally—e.g., in not enforcing
assault laws against domestic violence or in nullifying the killing of
women by the defense of honor—that would be discrimination, an
appropriate human rights concern.
But the notion of treating the phenomenon of private violence
against as discrimination per se, or as torture or enslavement, or even
as a violation of the international protection of life, liberty or
personal security when tolerated by the state, was taking matters too
far. Including private gendered violence, it was said, would “dilute”
the human rights framework. Thus feminists had to challenge this
incarnation of the public/private distinction, and discovered, in the
process, that the international human rights process was not
impenetrable to global organizing and that basic human rights
principles include certain positive state responsibilities that should
apply to private gender violence.
The Vienna Conference was a watershed. Testimonies as to the
gravity and pervasiveness of gender violence, the force of women’s
broad organizing, and the very concrete fact, brought home by the
participation of women from Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, that
women were being raped systematically in Bosnia—just hours from
the site of the Conference—prevailed over objections to
incorporating gender violence as a human rights problem. They also
prevailed over the vigorous chorus of “nos” from defenders of archly
patriarchal religions and cultures, who may condemn violence
against women but who also contend that it is not an international
problem and that sexual subordination in the home should be
excluded from the human rights framework. The new consensus is
reflected in the official document, the Vienna Declaration and
3
Programme of action.
The historic achievement of Vienna Conference was two-fold: the
recognition of violence against women as a human rights issue and
the setting into motion of a process of integrating or
“mainstreaming” issues of women’s rights and gender equality into
the international system at all levels. The process, when carefully
monitored by women and when in the hands of women or men
committed to gender-inclusiveness, has produced a tremendous
literature and significant advances. This is true not only
internationally but also at the national and local level, as NGOs bring
the international framework home and countries are called upon by

3. U/N Doc. A/Conf. 157/24, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
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international bodies to report their progress in implementing
remedies against domestic violence.
Significant international documents address domestic violence as a
human rights problem. These include Recommendation No. 19,
4
“Violence Against Women,” of the Committee to End Discrimination
Against Women (which monitors implementation of CEDAW); the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Elimination of Violence Against Women (called the Convention of
5
Belém do Pará), the unanimously approved UN General Assembly
6
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the
7
Beijing Platform for Action, and the reports of Radhika
Coomaraswamy as the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
8
Women: Its Causes and Consequences, which reports have been
accepted by annual resolutions of the UN Human Rights Commission
on the Rights of Women.
While the UN human rights system operates primarily through
various shaming techniques, the recent Rome Treaty creating the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is different. Despite vigorous
objections from the Vatican and some Islamist countries, the ICC’s
jurisdiction encompasses rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization and other sexual violence in time of peace as
well as war as crimes against humanity when such violence is
widespread or systematic and is the consequence of state or
organizational policy. The ICC exists not only as an institution of
justice but as an incentive to states to adopt and prosecute these
crimes domestically.
Thus, for example, acceptance or
encouragement of marital rape or battering by law or by
organizational leaders is one example of the ICC’s potential reach.
At the same time, intimate gender-based violence seems intractable
and the obstacles endure. In United Nations arenas, a small band of
countries, representing various fundamentalisms, and now joined by
4. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, U.N. HCHR, 11th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/47/38 (1992)
5. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, “Convention of Belém do Pará,” June 9,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
6. G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993).
7. 35 I.L.M. 401 (1996).
8. Preliminary Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,
Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission
on Human Rights Resolution 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994). To view the various reports issued by Ms. Coomaraswamy
and the Human Rights Commission’s resolutions, visit the UN High Commissioner
of Human Rights website at http://www.unhchr.ch.
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representatives of the Bush Administration, continues to challenge
the Vienna framework. In addition to outright obstruction, the full
implementation of the obligation to eliminate gender-based violence
in international or domestic policy has yet to be achieved in practice
as the implementers commonly lack commitment or know-how.
Beyond that, having just passed through the first stage of recognition,
the problems, which Liz highlights in her book, of de-politicization
and fragmentation, the tension between victimization and agency,
the need for collaboration with and dangers of cooptation by the
state, and the cultural embeddedness of violence against women, are
also among the dilemmas faced by international activists.
Nonetheless, there are a number of important ways in which the
international human rights recognition of gender-based violence,
and particularly intimate violence, should strengthen and inspire the
struggle here as well as abroad. The fact that intimate violence is now
clearly a human rights issue is itself significant and heightens the
demand for vigorous and multifaceted preventive and remedial
action by the state. In this time of unprecedented and frightening
attack by the Bush Administration on both political and civil rights at
home and in foreign relations, it is especially important that United
States activists utilize and defend human rights norms. In that
defense, we not only enhance the significance of the problem of
intimate violence and bring home some of the more capacious and
positive aspects of international human rights obligations; we also
reinforce the over-arching importance of universal principles and
multilateral frameworks for human security and human rights
generally.
Liz points out the significance of the international acceptance of
the concept that gender violence as per se gender discrimination.
International recognition of gender violence as a human rights
violation does not depend upon showing that the state inflicted it or
that the state treated violence against women differently from
violence against men. Rather, gender violence is viewed as inherently
discriminatory in that it both reflects inequality and perpetuates it.
This approach is rooted in an acknowledgment of the impact of this
systemic practice and the necessity to prioritize its elimination. It
entrains the positive obligation of the state under the International
9
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (“ICCPR”) to ensure people
against attack on their rights by others and the obligation, set forth in
CEDAW and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
9. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
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10

Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), to both eliminate discrimination
and take positive steps to achieve full equality.
Recognition by the international human rights system is an
important step in transforming private gender violence from a
personal to a political issue. Paralleling right-wing anti-federalist
opposition to the federal Violence Against Women Act here,
opponents of recognizing privately inflicted gender violence as a
human rights violation argued that this is a municipal or “domestic”
law matter inappropriate for international scrutiny, sanction or
redress. Internationally, the argument that addressing domestic
battering transcends the proper scope of the state-centric human
rights system had superficial plausibility. The focus of human rights
on the wrongs committed by states was already a significant inroad
into state sovereignty. State wrongdoing, it was argued, is the
appropriate target because the state has a greater capacity to harm
and where the state is the wrongdoer, the victim has no recourse.
However, feminist advocates around the globe insisted upon and
demonstrated—through
women’s
tribunals,
testimonies,
documentation,
statistical
compilations,
scholarship,
and
manifestations—that the harm done by the batterer is no less grave
than that perpetrated by the state. Further, as Celina Romany
elucidated in her classic article on the public/private distinction in
international human rights, women in battering relationships, when
denied meaningful recourse to the state, are relegated by the state to
rule by a private, and equally absolute “parallel state”—the rule of the
batterer. In other words, neither human rights law, nor the state, can
claim to be neutral when it does nothing to prevent private abuse,
11
because the impact in fact is to empower the abuser.
Further, as Liz points out, to elucidate the gravity and political
nature of private gender violence, feminist human rights advocates
and scholars analogized battering to enslavement and torture. The
issue of torture, for example, was first brought to the table by Latin
American women who, while fighting dictatorial repression in their
countries, recognized that what they or their sisters were suffering at
home had far too much in common with the violence inflicted on
political prisoners in the jails. The analogy to torture and slavery
challenges the traditional trivialization of private violence as well as
10. 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969).
11. See Celina Romany, Women as Aliens, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993); see also
Elizabeth Schneider & Nadine Taub, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328 (3d ed. 1998) (l982) (argued that the
state’s traditional hands-off approach to violence in family life is not neutral but
rather supports women’s subordination).
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shifts the responsibility from the blameful woman to the batterer.
These arguments provide an additional lens, illuminating women’s
dependency, not as a product of their own weakness or pathology,
but as a function of the exercise of political power and control. By
probing the relevance of torture and enslavement and utilizing these
terms to characterize severe battering and marital rape, feminists
challenged the tendency to see this violence as somehow permissible
or inevitable. As the author of an early article analogizing domestic
12
violence to torture, I still hear frequently from battered women
survivors and advocates that the process of understanding battering
as torture put their suffering in a new and empowering perspective.
These ends, and not the justification of higher penalties, should be
the point of illuminating the discrepancy between the gravity of
intimate violence and the impunity traditionally accorded it.
Again, traditional human rights advocates originally argued that
the concept of torture had no bearing on violence against women at
least unless the violence was state-inflicted or explicitly statesanctioned. Nonetheless, women persisted and the notion that rape
and battering can constitute torture or enslavement gained ground in
official documents as well as in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
13
International Criminal Tribunals. It also is very significant that, as
this symposium goes to press, Amnesty International has begun a
domestic violence campaign that relies heavily on the analogy to
torture. Understanding domestic violence as torture thus situates
intimate violence as a form of political violence and helps to
illuminate the impossibility of eliminating one without the other. It
also opens the door, for example, to relief for battered women
refugees who cannot legally be returned to countries where they are
in danger of torture.
The international human rights system also helps us to understand
the nature of battering as a “cultural practice.” Western media tend
to focus on “cultural practices”—honor killings, female genital
mutilation, and dowry deaths, for example—as human rights
violations. But these are simply ritualized and openly legitimated
versions of the implicitly accepted violence in the everyday—the
intimidation, humiliation, beating, rape and killing of women in
intimate relationships for some form of resistance to their gender-

12. Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence As
Torture, 25 COL. HUM. RTS. L.REV. 291 (1994).
13. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002 I.C.T.Y. No. IC-96-23, IC-96-23/1-A
(affirming a twenty-eight year conviction for the repeated raping of a detained
Muslim women during the Bosnian Serb and Muslim conflict).
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determined role or for no reason at all. In other words, throughout
the world, as well as in the United States, intimate battering of
women is a pervasive “cultural practice,” rooted in patriarchal norms
of male superiority and control and female inferiority and obedience,
encased in familial and social and economic structures of inequality,
terrorizing women and perpetuating gender conformity and
oppression. A culturally embedded practice requires also a cultural
response. CEDAW, for example, requires states to “take appropriate
measures to . . . modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on
14
stereotyped roles for men and women.”
Contrary to our constitutional system, the international human
rights system—including political and civil rights—imposes positive as
well as negative state responsibilities. Under our federal
constitutional system, claims that the state is responsible for failing to
protect, prevent or punish have no force. In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County,15 the Supreme Court crystallized the extreme and cruel form
of negative constitutional protection that dominates our system in
denying redress for the state’s knowing failure to protect a helpless
16
child from his father’s violence. In Harris v. McRae, the Court told
poor women needing Medicaid to exercise the right to abortion that
their inability to obtain abortion was their fault. The state has no
obligation either to provide a person the means to exercise a
fundamental right or even to avoid discriminating against that
exercise by favoring one option over another (thereby funding
pregnancy, but not abortion).
Excepting essentially custodial
situations, the state has only the duty to refrain from actively harming
a person. As a federal constitutional matter, we are often reminded
that the state has no obligation to enact murder laws or to stop a
murder or a battering apart from the rare case where selectivity
renders the omission discriminatory.
The international human rights framework, however, does require
murder laws and much more. The ICCPR identifies two concepts of
state responsibility: the duty to respect (negative) or do no harm and
the duty to ensure (positive) the protection of these rights as against
private interference as well as the means to exercise basic rights.
Acquiescence in privately inflicted torture renders the state directly
14. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5(a).
15. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
16. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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responsible. Thus, the state has, at least, the obligation to exercise
due diligence to protect women from the harm of intimate violence
just as it is obligated to protect the life, liberty and personal security
of all its citizenry. Under CEDAW, a state has a broader obligation to
take positive measures to eliminate gender-based violence as part and
parcel of the obligation to eliminate both intentional and disparate
impact discrimination. Thus the positive responsibilities of the state
under human rights law to protect even what our Supreme Court has
labeled negative rights are, in theory, far reaching. They include not
only the duty to investigate and punish, but also to prevent, protect,
rehabilitate and develop and implement a plan to eliminate such
violence in every sphere. These obligations are reinforced by the
obligation in CERD to take positive measures to eliminate racial
discrimination. Although originally resistant to incorporating a
gender perspective, the CERD Committee has recently issued
Recommendation No. 25, which partially adopts an intersectional
analysis of race and gender discrimination with respect to private
17
violence.
To the extent that our constitutional system embraces
international law, the positive obligations of the international
framework should eventually bear concrete fruit here despite
18
persistent objections from successive administrations. Consider a
familiar and narrow example—the provision of a federal judicial
remedy for gender-based discrimination such as legislated by
19
Congress under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).
Under the ICCPR, which the United States has ratified, the state has
the duty to provide appropriate remedies for gender violence,
including judicial remedies.
With our students at CUNY’s
International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, Cathy Albisa and I
sought to defend the VAWA cause of action on international law
grounds through submitting the Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf Of
International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts to the
17. General Recommendation 25, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/55/18 (2000).
18. The United States has ratified the ICCPR, CERD, and the UN Convention
Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
albeit with broad reservations, understandings and declarations designed to limit
their scope and enforceability, including to prevent treaty-based claims without
explicit Congressional approval. The United States has signed CEDAW and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child which entails the responsibility not to act
inconsistently with their purpose or spirit. In the Inter-American system, the United
States is bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of []Man” and
has signed the American Convention on Human Rights.
19. Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)).
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20
Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison. The amicus argued that
Congress’ power to implement treaty obligations and to confer
Article III jurisdiction on the federal courts over treaty-based and
customary international law claims, enables Congress to enact
remedies against gender-based violence irrespective of whether it has
authority to do so under the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth
Amendment. The Clinton Administration had already touted VAWA
as implementing legislation pursuant to the ICCPR and we
emphasized that VAWA also implemented the United States’
obligation under federal common law created by customary norms to
provide appropriate remedies for gender-based violence.
The Court, and, most disappointingly, the dissenters in Morrison,
did not even note this argument as one for the future, which would
have been appropriate since the issue had neither been addressed by
Congress nor argued below. Nonetheless, unless this increasingly
rightist Supreme Court completely reframes the relationship of
international and domestic law—which is a very real and immediate
risk—these arguments should operate as a counterweight to
devolution and enable Congress to legislate enhanced protection of
the human right to be free of gender violence as well as other human
rights having comparable status in treaty or customary law.
The Vienna Convention’s mandate to “mainstream” gender in the
human rights system also applies to nations and has been an
important tool for local activists. Gender mainstreaming is pro-active.
In theory, all governmental and inter-governmental entities are
required to take initiative to examine the impact of their policies on
women, search out the invisibilized harms and inequalities that result,
and develop alternative approaches and remedies. To do this,
agencies and institutions are to have a gender focal point—someone
who has expertise in the subtleties of gender—with authority to
investigate, critique, jump start and implement reforms in a
continuing process of consultation with women affected and their
representatives. While this approach is not unknown in United States
domestic processes, it tends to become quickly marginalized when
separated from a positive human rights mandate. Taking the positive
obligations seriously calls for a far more systematic approach to
eliminating gender violence than is demanded by our negative
Constitution or by remedies that depend upon individual cases.
Gender-mainstreaming, gender analysis, and gender budgeting
would make a difference if adopted as domestic policy. Along with

20. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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heightening awareness of the human rights system and the
seriousness of intimate gender violence, these mainstreaming
strategies are among the goals of current efforts in the U.S. to enact
CEDAW and CERD on a state or local basis. As local initiatives, they
emphasize the importance of the human rights framework generally
and of national ratification CEDAW, in terms both of the definition
of discrimination and the reach of state responsibility.
While the international system can inspire and legitimate change,
international initiatives and impact will wane or rise with the strength
of the continued mobilization and monitoring by the women’s
movement. The long overdue but rapid progress in women’s human
rights in the 1990s also spawned the proverbial backlash, to slow
down or block advances by women both domestically and
internationally. Progress is endangered by the rise of various
fundamentalisms and their impact on governmental policies. This
applies to the efforts of the Vatican to pressure its constituent states
and of certain Islamic governments which oppose women’s human
rights, but also to the startling fact that anti-choice and anti-equality
advocates now sit on the United States delegation in the place of the
feminists who were included to a limited extent by the Clinton
Administration. Although the Clinton Administration ultimately
supported human rights initiatives with respect to gender violence, it
too brought to the table a neo-liberal fundamentalism and opposed
economic and social rights and development commitments. Because
of the tremendous power of the United States in the United Nations
system, it is critical that the women’s anti-violence movement, and the
women’s and progressive movements generally, keep the pressure on
the U.S. Administration at home and utilize human rights principles
and the human rights system to bring attention to its failures. The
impact will be felt both domestically and internationally.
All of this is not to deny that the international human rights system
still operates more in rhetoric than in reality. The range of problems
and contradictions that Liz discusses in her book also plague the
official international human rights approaches. While it is undeniably
progress that the international system has finally recognized gender
violence as a human rights matter, the remedies are primarily statecentric. This raises, in turn, the limitations and dangers of
transferring reliance for protection to, and, thereby, enhancing, the
policing power of the state. What happens to women’s alternative
remedies—the protective whistles used in Nicaragua and the shaming
tactics, picketing, etc., with which movement in many places,
including here, began? Casting women as victims draws attention
and support, but victimization approaches can undermine rather
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than advance the goal of women’s empowerment. And dealing only
with violence rather than with the broader underlying social,
economic, cultural and racial discrimination, as well as poverty, all of
which perpetuate the conditions for gender violence, is to focus on
the tip of the iceberg.
Liz ends her book with a compelling plea to reinvigorate the
struggle against the separation of the problem of gender violence
from gender equality. The same problem exists, not as a theoretical
but as a practical matter, in the United Nations system when it comes
to the fashioning of concrete remedies. For example, the mandate of
the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences was the product of women’s demand for a rapporteur on
violence and discrimination. Closely linked to the separation of gender
violence from discrimination is the even greater chasm between the
commitment progressively to implement economic and social rights,
which is also crucial to addressing the cycle of gender violence and
dependency as well as women’s inequality.
Unlike our constitutional system, the international framework
stands on the foundation of indivisibility and interdependence of all
human rights and for the application of human rights norms to all
aspects of human activity, including the intimate sphere as well as the
still exempt global economic structures and multinational
corporations. Expanding the reach and power of human rights is
thus a priority here and around the globe. The human rights system
should not be viewed as cabined by the limitations of its official
decrees or official mechanisms of enforcement. Human rights is
fundamentally a movement and its progress is maintained by the
same irrepressible spirit and organized mobilizations that so recently
forced recognition of private gender violence as a human rights issue
and by those who continue to insist that gender violence, gender
inequality and poverty are inextricable.
Liz reminds us of the beginnings of the women’s and anti-violence
movements in the U.S. Having taken several steps forward, we must
recapture these beginnings to propel the dialectic toward the
elimination of violence, inequality and poverty here. Integrating
human rights and the experience of our sisters abroad will hopefully
fuel these efforts and reshape the debate and the remedies in the
decades to come.
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